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ARTICLES
RING V. ARIZONA AND CAPITAL PROCEEDINGS:
BRAVE NEW WORLD OR A REVERSION
TO THE OLD WORLD?
T. CUNNINGHAM*
HEATHER L. RATELADE**
BRUCE

AMANDA ZIMMER***

"[F]orpurposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trialguarantee, the underlying offense of 'murder' is a distinct, lesser included offense of
'murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances." "
-Justice Scalia in Sattazahn
"[T]oday's judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing."2
-Justice Scalia concurring in Ring
In Apprendi v. New Jersey3 and Blakely v. Washington,4 the Su-

preme Court of the United States declared it is the exclusive role of a
jury to determine all facts necessary to convict a defendant of a particular crime. In Ring v. Arizona,5 the Court extended Apprendi's bed-

rock Sixth Amendment principles to the context of capital
punishment. In the first installment of this two-part article, the au* Bruce T. Cunningham, Jr. graduated from UNC-Chapel Hill with a B.A. in Political
Science as a Morehead Scholar in 1970. He has been a criminal defense attorney since earning
his J.D. at the University of Virginia Law School in 1973. Mr. Cunningham has represented
defendants charged with murder for over thirty years.
** Ms. Rattelade graduated from North Carolina State University with a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science in 2005. She is a J.D. Candidate at North Carolina Central University
School of Law and will graduate in 2008. Ms. Rattelade has worked as a Mitigation Specialist
since 2003.
*** Ms. Zimmer earned her J.D. from Wake Forest University in 2006, where she was a
member of Moot Court Board and competed in the Stanley Moot Court Competition, where she
was Runner Up for Best Brief. A 2003 graduate of East Carolina University, majoring in Economics, minoring in Business, Ms. Zimmer has been with the Law Offices of Bruce Cunningham
for over a year.
1. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003).
2. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
3. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
4. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
5. Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
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thors explored the implications of Apprendi/Blakely on North Carolina's Structured Sentencing Act6 ("SSA"), suggesting that the SSA as
we know it cannot withstand the full
impact of the Supreme Court's
7
current view of the jury trial right.
In this part, the authors argue that Ring's extension of the Apprendi
principle will revolutionize the way capital cases are tried in North
Carolina to the benefit of persons charged with capital crimes. Developments in death penalty jurisprudence, beginning with the Eighth
Amendment challenge in Furman and ending with the Sixth Amendment challenge in Ring, establish that "Capital Murder" or "Aggravated First Degree Murder" is a crime which is separate from and
greater than "First Degree Murder" or "Murder Simpliciter." 8
We believe that in order to understand Ring's impact on capital litigation, the case must be viewed not as a foray into the uncharted territory of a constitutional role for juries in sentencing; rather as a return
to the understanding of the jury's role at the time of the Founding
Fathers, which was simply to determine whether a defendant committed a particular crime or not. 9
All of the opinions expressed by the authors are based on the concept that the Founding Fathers strongly believed that a defendant
should be found guilty of a crime because of what he did, not who he
is. So too, we believe, in First Degree Murder trials, defendants
should be exposed to the possibility of a death sentence because of
what they do, not who they are. We contend that Ring requires that
only characteristics of the capital offense may comprise the elements
of the crime which makes a defendant eligible for death, and then
characteristics of the capital defendant, plus characteristics of the offense, may be used to decide whether death is the appropriate punishment. While this notion appears simple, it has enormous
consequences for North Carolina in the way death penalty trials are
conducted and would require a number of changes in current law.
First, we believe that Ring will require the State to give the defendant notice before trial of which particular aggravating factors the
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.10-1340.33 (2007).
7. Bruce Cunningham, Heather Rattelade & Amanda Zimmer, Apprendi/Blakely: A Primer for Practitioners,30 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 1 (2007).
8. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 112 ("Murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances is a
separate offense from 'murder' simpliciter."). Since the authors believe that calling a crime
"Capital Murder" necessarily suggests to a jury that a person convicted of Capital Murder
should receive capital punishment, we will refer to murder plus an aggravating factor as "Aggravated First Degree Murder."
9. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499 (stating that the inquiry in Apprendi turned on the "the
seemingly simple question of what constitutes a 'crime'").
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State contends exist in a case, thereby overruling State v. Taylor's
holding to the contrary.1 °
Second, we contend that North Carolina's list of aggravating factors
must be divided into two lists of aggravators known as "death eligibility factors" and "death selection factors."'" The list of eligibility fac-

tors must contain only facts related to the circumstances of the crime
or the circumstances of the victim (e.g. whether the victim is a policeman). Circumstances of the defendant may not be used as an eligibility aggravator. 2 The eligibility factor functions as the distinguishing
element between First Degree Murder and Aggravated First Degree
Murder. Once the jury has decided the elements of the crime, it then

must consider sentencing for the greater crime of Aggravated First
Degree Murder. In his article, "Conceptualizing Blakely," Professor
Douglas Berman, a leading expert on criminal sentencing issues, discusses at length the "offense/offender characteristic" dichotomy. Pro-

fessor Berman says, "[S]entencing is about assessing both the offense

and the offender to impose a just and effective punishment."1 3 Therefore, the second list of aggravators, or selection factors, may contain
facts related to the status of the defendant in addition to circumstances of the crime or the victim.14
Third, in the post-Ring world, we contend that the State will no
longer be able to convert a crime which was non-capital when committed into a crime which is capital when tried, overruling State v.
Squires. 5 Under current law, a defendant who is charged with committing both a violent felony and a homicide can be tried for the fel-

ony first in an effort by the state to manipulate the defendant's prior
10. State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 257 (1983). The aggravating factors in North Carolina are
found in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (2007), are collected and categorized in Appendix A
following this article.
11. See Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 216 at n.2 (2006) ("Our cases have frequently employed the terms 'aggravating circumstance' or 'aggravating factor' to refer to those statutory
factors which determine death eligibility in satisfaction of Furman's narrowing requirement.").
See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994). The terminology surrounding the statutory
factors for the death penalty becomes confusing when, as in Tuilaepa, a State employs the term
"aggravating circumstance" to refer to factors that play a different role, determining which defendants eligible for the death penalty will actually receive that penalty; see also Cal. Penal Code
Ann. § 190.3 (West 1999).
12. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (e)(3) ("Aggravating circumstances which may be
considered shall be limited to the following: [t]he defendant had been previously convicted of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person or had been previously adjudicated
delinquent in a juvenile proceeding for committing an offense that would be a Class A, B1, B2,
C, D, or E felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person if the offense had been
committed by an adult.").
13. Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, 17 FED. SENr'o REP. 89, 89 (2004).
14. Selection factors may include the fact that the defendant is a recidivist. See also Appendix A, supra.
15. State v. Squires, 357 N.C. 529, 591 S.E.2d 837 (2003) (declining to impose a requirement
that the conviction for the prior felony precede the occurrence of the capital murder itself).
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record to create the prior violent felony aggravator,16 which did not
exist on the
date of offense, in order to make the defendant eligible
17
death.
for
Fourth, the Rules of Evidence must apply to the determination of
eligibility factors. Under current North Carolina law, sentencing proceedings are exempted from the Rules of Evidence."8 Since a conviction for Aggravated First Degree murder depends upon the finding of
an eligibility factor, the Rules of Evidence should apply to it in the
same manner in which the Rules apply to the determination of other
elements of the crime.
Finally, we believe that the Eighth Amendment's requirement of a
narrowing of the class of persons convicted of murder to the class of
persons eligible for death must take place at the guilt phase. In his
Ring concurrence, Justice Scalia makes this point, stating that the determination of aggravating factors making a defendant eligible for
death "logically belongs" in the first phase of a trial.19 Under current
North Carolina law, the narrowing function takes place after a finding
of guilt at the penalty phase,2 ° because a person convicted of premeditated murder or felony murder, nothing else appearing, is not exposed
to the possibility of a death sentence. Rather, a sentence of life without parole must be imposed for all persons currently convicted of first
degree murder at the guilt phase.2" After Ring, a defendant is exposed to death only upon a conviction for Aggravated First Degree
Murder.
This article begins with a summary of the two primary animating
principles of the Court's capital jurisprudence: the Eighth Amendment requirements that a jury's discretion to find a defendant guilty of
a death-qualifying crime be guided and the jury be able to consider
characteristics of the defendant before selecting death as the appropriate punishment. A brief summary of Apprendi follows.
Next, the authors discuss Ring v. Arizona and Sattazahn v. Penn-

sylvania. Ring extends the Apprendi Rule to capital litigation and Justice Scalia's opinion in Sattazahn sets forth the basic proposition that
First Degree Murder is a crime separate from and lesser than Aggravated First Degree Murder. The article concludes with the prediction
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(3) (2007).
17. See Squires, 357 N.C. at 538, 591 S.E.2d at 843.
18. See N.C. R. EVID. 1011.
19. Ring, 536 U.S. at 612-613 (holding that "Those States that leave the ultimate life-ordeath decision to the judge may continue to do so by requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating
factor in the sentencing phase or, more simply, by placing the aggravating-factor determination
(where it logically belongs anyway) in the guilt phase.").
20. State v. Williams, 317 N.C. 474, 298 S.E.2d 645 (1983).
21. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000.
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of inevitable revolutionary change in the trials of capital cases in
North Carolina.
PART ONE:
A.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Furman, Lockett and the Eighth Amendment

2
In Furman v. Georgia,"
the Supreme Court issued a plurality opinion which held that the death penalty was unconstitutional.2 3 The
controlling ground was that the death penalty violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments because it was arbitrarily inflicted. 4 Although each of the concurring Justices rested their opinions on different grounds, 5 the prevailing principle requires a jury to be guided by
objective standards in order to limit the class of murderers eligible to
receive the death penalty.2 6
In an effort to alleviate the Court's concern about arbitrarily inflicted death sentences, thirty-five States adopted new capital sentencing procedures. 27 Four years later, the Court issued five separate
plurality opinions as to whether the various new death penalty sentencing procedures implemented in North Carolina,2 s Louisiana,2 9
Texas, 30 Georgia,3 1 and Florida 32 overcame the constitutional deficiencies raised in Furman.3 3
North Carolina and Louisiana argued their new death schemes removed the "unbridled jury discretion" by mandating death for certain
crimes. The Court struck down these schemes as unconstitutional because mandating death for certain offenses still failed to allow a jury

22. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
23. Id. at 239-240.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 414-415 (Dissenting, J. Powell, joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist) ("Mr. Justice
DOUGLAS concludes that capital punishment is incompatible with notions of 'equal protection'
that he finds to be 'implicit' in the Eighth Amendment. Mr. Justice BRENNAN bases his judgment primarily on the thesis that the penalty 'does not comport with human dignity.' Mr. Justice
STEWART concludes that the penalty is applied in a 'wanton' and 'freakish' manner. For Mr.
Justice WHITE it is the 'infrequency' with which the penalty is imposed that renders its use
unconstitutional. Mr. Justice MARSHALL finds that capital punishment is an impermissible
form of punishment because it is 'morally unacceptable' and 'excessive."') (internal citations
omitted).
26. Brown, 546 at 216.
27. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 659 (1990) (Scalia, J. concurring).
28. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
29. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
30. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 263 (1976).
31. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
32. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
33. The Harvard Law Review Association, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term; Constitutional
Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 99 n.6 (1978) ("Four decisions accompanied Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976).... The controlling votes in each case were cast by Justices Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens (hereinafter "the plurality").").
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to focus on the circumstances of the particular offense and the character and propensities of the defendant.3 4 The Court held the Texas,
Georgia, and Florida schemes complied with Furman because they
"genuinely narrowed the class of persons eligible for the death penalty" by requiring a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, in addition to allowing the sentencer to consider the
circumstances of the particular offense and the character and propensities of the defendant when determining whether to impose a death
sentence.3 5 In short, Furman requires an "eligibility phase," which
seeks to constrain the discretion of the jury when convicting a defendant of a capital crime.3 6
Lockett v. Ohio struck down Ohio's new capital sentencing procedure, which required a defendant to be sentenced to death if at least
one of seven specified aggravating circumstances and none of the
three statutory mitigating circumstances were found to exist.37 The
procedure was unconstitutional because once a determination was
made that none of the three statutory mitigating factors existed at the
bifurcated penalty hearing, the statute effectively mandated the death
penalty without allowing a jury to consider additional information regarding the character and propensities of the defendant. 3 8 Lockett
stands for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment requires that
the sentencer must not be prevented from considering any characteristics of the offender and any of the circumstances surrounding the
crime when deciding whether a defendant convicted of Aggravated
First Degree Murder should receive a death sentence.39 In other
words, Lockett requires a selection phase, which expands the discretion of the sentencer by allowing an "individualized consideration" of
all potentially mitigating or aggravating evidence.4"
The combined effect of Furman and Lockett requires capital convictions "to be governed by objective standards to ensure regularity and
consistency of application", while at the same time allowing capital
sentencing to "remain infinitely sensitive to the circumstances of the
particular case" and offender.4 1
34. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333-334.
35. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164, 196-197, 206; see
also Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242, 256-257 n.14 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
36. Nathan A. Forrestor, Judge Versus Jury: The Continuing Validity of Alabama's Capital
Sentencing Regime after Ring v. Arizona, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1157, 1196 (2002-2003).
37. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 600 (1978).
38. Id. at 608 (re-affirming the principle set forth in the plurality opinion in Woodson v.
North Carolina,428 U.S. 280).
39. Id. at 604; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
40. Forrestor, supra note 36, at 1196.
41. Id.
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Apprendi Summary

On June 24, 2000, the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision,
decided Apprendi v. New Jersey,4 2 bringing about a shift in the roles of
judges and juries when deciding whether someone is guilty of a crime.
Mr. Apprendi was charged with possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, a crime for which he could receive 10 years in
prison.4 3 However, because a judge found that Mr. Apprendi was motivated by racial animus the sentence was "aggravated" to 12 years.4 4
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibited a judge from increasing the potential punishment by finding a fact which should have been submitted to a jury.
The Court announced the following rule: "Other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 45
must be submitted to a jury
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the capital litigation context, the "prescribed statutory maximum" for First Degree Murder is life without parole. Therefore, any
fact which increases a defendant's exposure to include a sentence of
death is an element of a greater offense and must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas succinctly states the issue:
"This case turns on the seemingly simple question of what constitutes
a crime. "46 Following Apprendi, the definition of "crime" applicable
to non-capital cases was dependent on the punishment to which a defendant was exposed. All facts essential to support a certain level of
punishment are elements of the crime.
The authors contend that Apprendi means that there are no more
"aggravated" sentences, only aggravated crimes. It is that basic proposition, extended to the capital arena, which ushered in the new era
in capital litigation.
C. Ring Summary
In Ring v. Arizona,a7 the Court was confronted with the issue of
whether the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applied to aggravating factors which were necessary in order to make a defendant eligible
to receive a death sentence. Twelve years earlier in Walton v. Ari42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 499 (Thomas, J. concurring).
Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
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zona,4 8 the Court had upheld the Arizona capital sentencing scheme

against a similar Sixth Amendment challenge. However, Walton was
decided before Apprendi v. New Jersey49 and was discussed by the
Court in Apprendi. In Apprendi, the Court noted that under the Arizona sentencing scheme at issue in both Walton and Ring the judge
did not "determine the existence of a factor which makes a crime a
capital offense."5 0 However, while the Arizona first degree murder
statute provided that a conviction is punishable by either life imprisonment or death, a death sentence could not be imposed without the
finding of an additional aggravating factor. 5 ' Seemingly, the rule in
Walton conflicted with Apprendi's mandate that "[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."5 2 Despite language in
Apprendi supporting the continued validity of Walton, the Arizona
Supreme Court determined that its capital sentencing scheme violated
Apprendi.5 3 However, because the Arizona Supreme Court was
bound by the precedent set out by the United States Supreme Court
in Walton, it ultimately ruled against Ring's Sixth Amendment challenge.5 4 In Ring, when the Supreme Court was directly confronted
with the issue of whether Apprendi and Walton were in conflict, it
determined that Walton had to be overruled.
In Ring, the Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder which occurred during the course of a robbery.56 The
judge then made two critical findings. First, the judge determined that
Ring was the one who killed the victim and was a major participant in
the robbery. Such a finding was necessary to impose the death penalty for felony murder under Enmund v. Florida57 and Tison v. Arizona.58 Second, the judge determined that two aggravating factors
existed.5 9 Without these findings, Ring would not have been eligible
48. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639.
49. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466.
50. Id. at 497 (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 257 (1998) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
51. ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1105(d), 13-703(e) (West Supp. 2007).
52. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
53. State v. Ring, 200 Ariz. 267, 280 25 P.3d 1139, 1152 (2001).
54. Id.
55. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
56. Id. at 591.
57. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (stating that before death can be imposed in a
felony murder case, Eighth Amendment requires that the defendant either killed or attempted
to kill the victim).
58. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (qualifying Enmund, and holding that Eighth
Amendment allows death as punishment when the defendant was a major participant in the
felony and demonstrated "reckless indifference to human life").
59. Ring, 536 U.S. at 594.
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for death. The judge then weighed the aggravating factors against the
one mitigating factor that he found and concluded that a death sentence was appropriate.6 °
Before the Supreme Court, Ring argued that even though the statute authorized the punishment of death for first degree murder, that
punishment could not have been imposed without the additional fact
finding made by the judge.6" The Court agreed and determined that
the Arizona system violated the Sixth Amendment.6"
In making this determination, the Court reiterated that the Apprendi Rule inquiry is one not of form but of effect.63 While technically the statute authorized a punishment of death for the crime of
first degree murder, the "defendant's death sentence required the
judge's factual findings."' Because of this, the finding by the judge of
an aggravating circumstance exposed Ring to a greater punishment
than the jury verdict alone authorized.6 5 The finding of an aggravating factor acted as "the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense," and the Sixth Amendment requires that it be found
by a jury.6 6 In this way, Ring made the definition of a "crime" in noncapital cases applicable to capital cases as well. Therefore, murder
plus one aggravator is a crime separate from simple murder and the
Sixth Amendment requires that a jury must decide whether the defendant is guilty of that greater offense. In his Ring concurrence Justice
Scalia, chief architect of the reversion to the original view of the scope
of the jury trial right which existed at the founding, makes it absolutely clear that Ring is not about capital sentencing. "While I am, as
always, pleased to travel in Justice Breyer's company, the unfortunate
fact is that today's decision has nothing to do with jury sentencing."67
It is about who finds someone guilty of a capital crime.
6 8 the United States Supreme Court
In Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania,
confronted another challenge to a death sentence and reiterated that
murder with an aggravating factor is a different crime from murder
without any aggravating factors.6 9 The challenge in Sattazahn was
based, not on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, but, on the
Fifth Amendment protection against Double Jeopardy.70 The case is
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 595.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 602, 604.
Id. at 603 (quoting Arizona v. Ring, 200 Ariz. 267, 279 (2001)).
Id. at 604.
Id. at 609 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 494, n.19).
Id. at 612.
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
Id. at 111.
Id. at 103.
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relevant to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence because, in deciding Sattazahn's Fifth Amendment claim, the Court confronted the issue of
what constitutes a capital offense, and in doing so, clarified that Ring
stood for the principle that murder where death is a possible punishment is a different crime than murder with life imprisonment as the
most severe punishment.7 1
Sattazahn was charged with murder after a restaurant manager was
killed during a robbery.7 2 The State gave notice of its intent to seek
the death penalty. 73 The State alleged two aggravating factors. 74 The
jury found Sattazahn guilty and recommended a sentence of death.7 5
In addressing the issue of what constitutes an "offense" for double
jeopardy purposes, the Court addressed the implications of Apprendi
and Ring on capital proceedings.76 Justice Scalia stated "for purposes
of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee, the underlying offense
of 'murder' is a distinct, lesser included offense of 'murder plus one or
more aggravating circumstances': Whereas the former exposes a defendant to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, the latter increases the maximum permissible sentence to death. '' 77 Justice Scalia
explained that there was no "principled reason" to distinguish what
constitutes an offense under the Sixth Amendment and what constitutes an offense under the Fifth Amendment. 78 Therefore, "If a jury
unanimously concludes that a State has failed to meet its burden of
proving the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances,
double-jeopardy protections attach to that 'acquittal'
on the offense of
'murder plus aggravating circumstance(s)."' 79
Justice Scalia reiterated that, following Ring, "'murder plus one or
more aggravating circumstances' is a separate offense from 'murder'
simpliciter."8 ° It is "properly understood to be a lesser included of71. See id. at 111. The authors recognize that only Justices Thomas and Rehnquist joined
Part III of Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, which is the part in which the offense discussion
occurs. However, it is reasonable to assume that Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, members of the Apprendi majority, would have joined Part IIIhad they not dissented from the Fifth
Amendment holding.
72. Id. at 103.
73. Id. at 105.
74. Id. (The aggravating factors were commission of the murder while in the perpetration of
a felony (robbery) and significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of
violence to the person. The second aggravating factor was based on guilty pleas entered after
the defendant's first trial but before the second trial.).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 112 (addressing the double jeopardy application to capital sentencing issue, which
Justices Thomas and Rehnquist joined); id. at 116 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (declining to extend the application of Apprendi any further.).
77. Id. at 111.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 112.
80. Id.
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81
fense of 'first-degree murder plus aggravating circumstance(s).'
The Court ultimately concluded the Double Jeopardy clause did not
bar the state from trying the defendant for aggravated first degree
murder after he had been convicted of first degree murder at his first
trial, but the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on aggravated
first degree murder.8 2
As a result of Ring and Sattazahn, it is clear that what is currently
referred to as a capital sentencing proceeding is truly a continuation of
the guilt phase. The jury is not merely finding aggravating factors in
order to impose a greater sentence-they are finding the facts necessary to convict the defendant of a greater crime: Aggravated First Degree Murder. Upon such a conviction, the death penalty becomes a
sentencing option. Under murder simpliciter, or murder of an ordinary person with the specific intent to kill, the death penalty is simply
not available as a punishment.

PART TWO:

CHANGES FOLLOWING RING

Following Ring, First Degree Murder is no longer a capital crime in
North Carolina. By definition, upon conviction of First Degree Murder the only sentence a defendant is exposed to is life without parole. 3 The only way for a defendant to be exposed to a sentence of
death is for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating factor exists.
It is critical to understand this basic shift in the definition of what
crime is considered a capital offense, as the change in definition is the
reason that other changes must take place. Above all else, the core
principle of Ring is that "Capital Murder" or "Aggravated First Degree Murder" is a crime which is separate from and greater than "First
Degree Murder" or "Murder Simpliciter." The differentiating element between First Degree Murder and Aggravated First Degree
Murder is the finding of one death eligibility fact. In a memorable
line from his Ring concurrence, Justice Scalia makes it clear that it
matters not what the legislature chooses to call the fact separating
First Degree Murder from Aggravated First Degree Murder. "[T]he
fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amend81. Id.
82. Id. at 112-13. See id. at 116 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (not agreeing with Scalia's opinion of Ring); id. at 126 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding that "Sattazahn's case was fully
tried and the court, on its own motion, entered a final judgment-a life sentence-[and]
terminat[ed] the trial proceedings").
83. State v. Williams, 317 N.C. 474, 298 S.E.2d 645 (1983); see also N.C.P.I.-CRIM. 150.10,
28 (2007) ("On the other hand, if you unanimously find from the evidence that none of the
aggravating circumstances existed,... you would answer Issue One, 'No.' If you answer Issue
One, 'No,' . . . you must recommend that the defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment.").
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ment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment
that the defendant receives-whether the statute calls them elements
of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must be found by
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt."8 4
Thus, upon a finding of a death eligibility factor, a defendant is then
exposed to two possible punishments, life without parole or death.
A.

Notice and Bills of Particulars

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
the State to give a defendant reasonable notice of what crime the
State contends the defendant committed.8 5
[I]n all criminal prosecutions the accused must be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; that in no case can there
be, in criminal proceedings, due process of law, where the accused is
not thus informed, and that the information which he is to receive is
that which will acquaint him with the essential particulars of the offense, so that he may appear in court prepared to meet every feature
of the accusation against him.8 6
Following Apprendi, the pertinent question became, "What is the
defendant entitled to notice of?" Justice Scalia answers that question
in what the authors believe is the most important sentence in the entire Sixth Amendment line of cases: "The jury could not function as
circuitbreaker in the State's machinery of justice if it were relegated to
making a determination that the defendant at some point did something wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts
of the crime the State actually seeks to punish." 87 Therefore, the Due
Process Clause requires notice of "the crime the State actually seeks
to punish,"8 8 which can only be provided if the prosecutor divulges
before trial what death eligibility factors the state seeks to submit to a
jury.
One possible means of providing notice to the defendant of what he
is being charged with is through the use of a Bill of Particulars. Section 15A-925 of the North Carolina General Statutes allows the defendant to file a motion asking that the trial court require the State to file
a Bill of Particulars specifying information "necessary to enable the
defendant adequately to prepare or conduct his defense."8 9
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J, concurring).
Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U.S. 262 (1897).
Id. at 269.
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306-307.
Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-925(c).
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In State v. Taylor,9" the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
State may not be compelled to divulge before the trial the aggravator
or aggravators upon which it relies to seek a sentence of death. The
North Carolina Supreme Court stated, "Although some other states
which also leave the question of punishment to the jury do require the
prosecution to provide evidence to defendant of the aggravating circumstances the State will pursue, such a requirement is purely statutory .... Our legislature has not enacted such a requirement."91 The
rationale was that aggravators were sentencing factors only and a defendant is not entitled to know in advance facts affecting the sentence
in a case as opposed to knowing all elements of a crime.9 2 We believe
that State v. Taylor93 cannot withstand Ring's conversion of one offense characteristic aggravator from a sentencing factor into an element of the greater crime of Aggravated First Degree Murder with
One Aggravator. Since the finding of one aggravator by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt is an essential element of Aggravated First Degree
Murder, in the post-Ring world a defendant is entitled to know what
crime he is being tried for: Is it Aggravated First Degree Murder with
the Murder being committed against a policeman? Or possibly, Aggravated First Degree Murder with the aggravator being that the killing occurred during the commission of armed robbery, burglary,
kidnapping, etc.
The Bill of Particulars statute requires the prosecution to divulge
"any or all of the items of information requested [in the motion for a
bill of particulars which] are necessary to enable the defendant adequately to prepare or conduct his defense."9 4 Therefore, following
Ring, the State is required to divulge aggravators it contends supports
the conviction of a crime exposing a defendant to death, even though
State v. Taylor95 determined the State was not required to do so.
B.

Death Eligibility Factorsand Death Selection Factors

In the Introduction, the authors stated that only offense characteristics (including characteristics of the victim, such as whether the victim
is a police officer or a government official) can serve to elevate the
crime of First Degree Murder to the crime of Aggravated First Degree
Murder. Therefore, the current list of aggravating factors listed in
N.C. Gen. Stat. section 15A-2000(e) needs to be divided into two lists
of factors: death eligibility factors and death selection factors. In Ap90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 257, 283 S.E.2d 761, 768 (1981).
Id.
See State v. Hunt, 357 N.C. 257, 275-76, 582 S.E.2d 593, 605-06 (2003).
Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 283 S.E.2d 761.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-925(c).
Taylor, 304 N.C. at 257, 283 S.E.2d at 768.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2008

13

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 2 [2008], Art. 2

120

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:107

pendix A, the authors have divided the current list of aggravators

N.C. Gen. Stat. section 15A-2000(e) into the two recommended
categories.
Basically, any aggravator which describes a status or characteristic9 6

of the defendant may not serve as an eligibility factor necessary to
convict a defendant of Aggravated First Degree Murder. This is be-

cause, as Professor Berman suggests, "[t]he jury trial right should be
understood to concern offense conduct and not offender characteristics because the state defines 'crimes' and accuses and prosecutes

based on what persons do and not based on who they are.... In short,
an essential offense/offender distinction should inform the jury trial
right."97 This fundamental principle appears in many contexts in the
Constitution. The Bill of Attainder Clause protects citizens against

legislation punishing them based on their heritage.9 8 The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that laws are applied evenly to all groups.9 9

The First Amendment guarantees that no person is punished based on
their particular religious beliefs or what they say as opposed to what

they do.' 00
The most prominent offender characteristic is the fact of a prior

crime of violence. As Justice Breyer states in his Almendarez-Torres

decision, "[R]ecidivism is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence." ' ' 1
Since a prior conviction of violence is the classic offender characteristic, 10 2 the authors believe it can no longer serve as an eligibility factor
10 3
used to convict a defendant of Aggravated First Degree Murder.

96. Or if the factor implies a characteristic of the defendant, such as "[t]he capital felony
was committed by a person lawfully incarcerated." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(1).
97. Berman, 17 FED. SEr'G REP. at 89.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
3; see also id. § 10, cl. 1.
99. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
100. U.S. CoNsT. amend I. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) ("'The mere abstract teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence,
is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.' A statute
which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from governmental control.") (internal citations omitted).
101. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998).
102. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(3) (2007).
103. In Almendarez-Torres, the Court held that a prior conviction was not an element of the
offense but rather a sentencing factor. Almendarez- Torres, 523 U.S. at 246. While the authors
recognize that Almendarez-Torres has not been overruled, its continued validity has been questioned by the Court. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The
Almendarez-Torres] holding was in my view a grave constitutional error affecting the most fundamental of rights."); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring)("Almendarez-Torres ... has been eroded by this Court's subsequent Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly
decided.").
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The Constitution frames the jury trial right in terms of 'crimes,' which
are the basis for a 'prosecution' of 'the accused.' This language connotes that the jury trial right attaches to all offense conduct for which
the state seeks to impose criminal punishment, but the language also
connotes that the jury trial right does not attach to any offender characteristics which
the state may deem relevant to criminal
10 4
punishment.
Therefore, in our opinion, if the only aggravating factor is a prior conviction of violence, following Ring, a defendant may not be exposed to
death since he cannot be convicted of Capital Murder. However, if
there are other eligibility factors found, the jury may use the prior
crime of violence as a selection factor.
C.

Turning Noncapital Murder into Capital Murder After the Fact

In State v. Burke"0 5 and State v. Squires,1" 6 the North Carolina Supreme Court approved the practice of prosecutors turning non-capital
cases into capital cases by trying a defendant for a crime after he was
arrested for the murder but before being tried for murder. After
Ring, such manipulation of the crime the defendant is accused of violates the separation of powers clause of the North Carolina Constitution' 0 7 and the ex post facto clause of the United States
Constitution. 108
The authors first contend that, as set forth above, prior convictions
can no longer be used as a death eligibility factor. But, regardless of
that argument, non-capital murder and capital murder constitute two
different crimes. Suppose a defendant kills someone on January 1, at
which time he has no prior convictions and no other aggravating factors exist. The worst sentence he could face upon conviction would be
life without parole because he could only be charged with First Degree Murder. However, a common practice has been to delay the trial
of the murder case if there is a pending violent felony charge which
could be tried first. Suppose the District Attorney tries the defendant
for Armed Robbery on June 1 and then contends that a death eligibility aggravator exists. Under that scenario, what is the date of the offense of Aggravated First Degree Murder? It would have to be June
1, when the defendant was already in jail, because all the essential
104. Douglas A. Berman, 17 FED. SENr'G REP. at 89 (emphasis in original).
105. State v. Burke, 343 N.C. 129, 159, 469 S.E.2d 901, 916 (1996) ("[l]t is not necessary that
a defendant be convicted before the commission of the capital murder so long as defendant has
been convicted of the violent felony prior to the capital trial.").
106. Squires, 357 N.C. at 529, 591 S.E.2d at 837.
107. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6.
108. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9; see also N.C. CoNst. art. 1, § 16.
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elements of Capital Murder did not exist until the defendant was convicted of the Armed Robbery charge.
Only the legislature can determine the parameters of punishment
for a crime. 10 9 A prosecutor manipulating the timing of a conviction
in order to support a death eligibility factor violates the legislative
dictate of what punishment applies to a crime in violation of the separation of powers clause of the North Carolina Constitution. The ex
post facto clause prohibits states from enacting a law that "changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed
to the crime, when committed." 1 ° The prosecutor should not be able
to achieve what the legislature could not. Therefore, the maximum
possible sentence a defendant can face should be set as of the date of
the killing, not a date six months later when the State tries the defendant for another crime.
D. Application of the Rules of Evidence to Eligibility Factor
Determination

Current law in North Carolina is that the Rules of Evidence do not
apply at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. 1 ' Ring overrules this
precedent and make the Rules of Evidence applicable against the
State for the determination of the death eligibility factor. The rationale for this change is that, after Ring, the determination of the eligibility factor which exposes a defendant to death is part of the trial of
an offense greater than First Degree Murder because the eligibility
factor is an element of the greater offense.11 2 Therefore, under N.C.
Gen. Stat. section 8C-1, Rule 101, the Rules of Evidence apply to the
determination of guilt to Aggravated First Degree Murder since it is,
in effect, a trial of a substantive offense. Rule 101 states, "These rules
govern proceedings in the courts of this State to the extent and with
the exceptions stated in Rule 1101."
Under Rule 1101, the Rules
are inapplicable during sentencing." 4 As the determination of the eligibility factor is no longer a matter of sentencing, or any other exception to the Rules of Evidence, the Rules must apply to its
determination. Once the eligibility factor has been found, the defendant has been convicted of Aggravated First Degree Murder.
109. State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 471, 340 S.E.2d 701, 718 (1986).
110. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
111. State v. Raines, 362 N.C. 1, 17, 653 S.E.2d 126, 136 (2007) ("[T]he Rules of Evidence are
not controlling in a capital penalty proceeding."); See State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 200-01, 451
S.E.2d 211, 227-28 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135 (1995).
112. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 112 (stating that first degree murder is "properly understood to
be a lesser included offense of 'first-degree murder plus aggravating circumstance(s)."').
113. N.C. R. EvID. 101.
114. N.C. R. EVID. 1101.
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The Rules of Evidence would not have to apply to selection factors
or mitigating factors. These factors go only to sentencing. There is no
constitutional requirement that selection factors or mitigating factors
be treated in the same manner as elements of the offense. If the determination of whether an eligibility factor exists is made during a
"sentencing phase," as it is currently referred to in North Carolina, the
trial court would be required to apply the Rules of Evidence to some
evidence at that proceeding but not all of the evidence.
E. Narrowing During the Guilt Phase
As only one eligibility factor is a required element necessary to convict a defendant of Aggravated First Degree Murder, its determination logically should take place in the first or guilt phase of the capital
proceeding. 11 5 By placing the determination of an eligibility factor in
the first part of the trial, the narrowing requirement of the Eighth
Amendment would be met because the jury would be able to determine if the defendant was guilty of Aggravated First Degree Murder
or the lesser offense of First Degree Murder based on the evidence
presented. Only those convicted of Aggravated First Degree Murder
would be eligible for the death penalty.
Placing the determination of an eligibility factor in the guilt phase
would simplify the procedure used to convict a defendant of Aggravated First Degree Murder. The Rules of Evidence would apply to its
determination in the same way they apply to all criminal trials and
evidence in support of all the elements of the offense would be
presented at one time. Also, once the jury had determined that the
defendant was guilty of Aggravated First Degree Murder, they no
longer have a constitutional role to play in the trial. Under North
Carolina statutory law, the jury would have a role to play in sentencing because they are called upon to weigh the selection factors and the
mitigating factors and recommend a sentence.
By moving the determination of the eligibility factor from the sentencing phase to the guilt phase, the entire trial procedure for Aggravated First Degree Murder would be the same as trials for other
offenses. The guilt phase of the trial would determine whether a defendant should be convicted of a crime and, if so, which one, and the
sentencing phase of the trial would determine the appropriate punishment following that conviction. The problem of having to conduct
115. Ring, 536 U.S. at 612-613 ("Those States that leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to
the judge may continue to do so by requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating factor in the
sentencing phase or, more simply, by placing the aggravating-factor determination (where it logically belongs anyway) in the guilt phase.").
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both a hearing on an element of a crime and on the sentence for that
crime would no longer exist.

PART THREE:
A.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary

The authors believe that Ring's reversion to principles in existence
at the founding requires a wholesale revision of North Carolina's capital trial process. We will conclude the article with a summary of the
basic principles which North Carolina's new capital jurisprudence
must embrace.
1) The State must give the defendant reasonable notice of "the
crime the State actually seeks to punish" by informing the defendant before trial of which eligibility factors the State contends
may be used to convict the defendant of Aggravated First Degree Murder, thus making him eligible for a sentence of death.
2) The current list of aggravating factors contained in N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-2000(e) must be divided into two lists. The first list
consists of facts which are offense characteristics and victim
characteristics. The second list may contain offender characteristics as well as offense and victim characteristics.
3) The State may no longer elevate a murder which was non-capital
when committed into a capital murder when tried.
4) The Rules of Evidence must apply to the determination of the
death eligibility factor since it is an essential element of the
greater offense and its determination is a matter for trial in the
ordinary sense of the term.
5) During the trial of a capital defendant, the determination of the
death eligibility fact must take place during the guilt phase since
it is an element of the greater substantive offense of Aggravated
First Degree Murder.
B.

Conclusion

More than any other area of the criminal law, capital jurisprudence
is a morass, made that way by decades of complicated rules superimposed on top of each other. There is currently an inherent "tension"
in the process related to trying a defendant for a substantive crime
simultaneously with conducting a sentencing hearing. Naturally, there
are things, which are relevant to sentencing, which focus on traits of
the defendant, which are extremely prejudicial to a defendant during
the phase where the inquiry is whether or not he committed a capital
crime. Furman requires an objective process to determine guilt.
Lockett requires a subjective process to select an appropriate senhttps://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol30/iss2/2
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tence. Ring supplies the framework to reconcile the predicament
which occurs when conducting both an objective proceeding and a
subjective one at the same time. By trying death eligibility factors at
phase one and trying death selection factors at phase two, a defendant
is not placed in an impossible situation of disputing his guilt and
presenting evidence which implies his guilt at the same time, such as
evidence of intoxication.
There has been very little litigation in North Carolina concerning
the possible benefits of Ring for capital defendants." 6 Hopefully, that
will change and the capital defense bar will use the Supreme Court's
reversion to the Founder's understanding of the Sixth Amendment to
benefit their clients.

116. Most litigation related to Ring has involved challenges to the short-form indictment as
not providing sufficient notice of the crime. See State v. Hunt, 357 N.C. 257, 582 S.E.2d 593
(2003); see also Squires, 357 N.C. 529, 591 S.E.2d 837.
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APPENDIX A: N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) CAPITAL
AGGRAVATING FACTORS CLASSIFIED

Aggravating Factor
(1) The capital felony
was committed by a
person lawfully incarcerated.

Is the
factor
Offenderor OffenseBased?
Mixed

Eligibility
Why it can/cannot be
or Selection
used as a deathFactor?
eligibility factor
Selection
While it refers to the
circumstances of the
offense, it implicates
characteristics of the
defendant and improperly injects recidivism
before the jury. Therefore, it is not valid as
an eligibility factor but
would be valid as a
selection factor.

(2) The defendant had
been previously convicted of another capital felony or had been
previously adjudicated
delinquent in a juvenile proceeding for
committing an offense
that would be a capital
felony if committed by
an adult.

Offender

Selection

While recidivism is
valid as a selection factor, it should not be
used as an eligibility
factor because it punishes the defendant for
who he is when the
crime was committed.

(3) The defendant had
been previously convicted of a felony
involving the use or
threat of violence to
the person or had been
previously adjudicated
delinquent in a juvenile proceeding for
committing an offense
that would be a Class
A, Bi, B2, C, D, or E
felony involving the
use or threat of violence to the person if
the offense had been
committed by an adult.

Offender

Selection

While recidivism is
valid as a selection factor, it should not be
used as an eligibility
factor because it punishes the defendant for
who he is when the
crime was committed.
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Aggravating Factor
(4) The capital felony
was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful
arrest or effecting an
escape from custody.

(5) The capital felony
was committed while
the defendant was
engaged, or was an
aider or abettor, in the
commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or
flight after committing,
or attempting to commit, any homicide, robbery, rape or a sex
offense, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or
aircraft piracy or the
unlawful throwing,
placing, or discharging
of a destructive device
or bomb.

Is the
factor
Offenderor OffenseBased?
Mixed

Eligibility
or Selection
Factor?
Both

Offense

Eligibility
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Why it can/cannot be
used as a deatheligibility factor
As to avoiding or
preventing lawful
arrest, it describes the
circumstances surrounding the crime and
the purpose in committing it. Therefore, as
to the first part, it is a
valid eligibility factor.
As to escape from custody, while the factor
refers to the circumstances of the offense,
it implicates characteristics of the defendant
and improperly injects
recidivism before the
jury. Therefore, as to
the second part, it is
not valid as an eligibility factor but valid as a
selection factor.
Describes the circumstances surrounding
the crime and the purpose in committing it.
Therefore, it is a valid
eligibility factor.
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Is the
factor
Offenderor OffenseBased?

Eligibility
or Selection
Factor?

(6) The capital felony
was committed for
pecuniary gain.

Offense

Eligibility

(7) The capital felony
was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function
or the enforcement of
laws.

Offense

Eligibility

(8) The capital felony
was committed against
a law-enforcement
officer, employee of
the Department of
Correction, jailer, fireman, judge or justice,
former judge or justice,
prosecutor or former
prosecutor, juror or
former juror, or witness or former witness
against the defendant,
while engaged in the
performance of his
official duties or
because of the exercise
of his official duty.

Offense

Eligibility

Aggravating Factor
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Why it can/cannot be
used as a deatheligibility factor
Describes the circumstances surrounding
the crime and the purpose in committing it.
Therefore, it is a valid
eligibility factor.
Describes the circumstances surrounding
the crime and the purpose in committing it.
Therefore, it is a valid
eligibility factor.
Describes the circumstances surrounding
the crime and the purpose in committing it.
Therefore, it is a valid
eligibility factor.
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Aggravating Factor
(9) The capital felony
was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel.

Is the
factor
Offenderor OffenseBased?
Offense

(10) The defendant
knowingly created a
great risk of death to
more than one person
by means of a weapon
or device which would
normally be hazardous
to the lives of more
than one person.

Offense

(11) The murder for
which the defendant
stands convicted was
part of a course of
conduct in which the
defendant engaged and
which included the
commission by the
defendant of other
crimes of violence
against another person
or persons.

Offense
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Eligibility
Why it can/cannot be
or Selection
used as a deathFactor?
eligibility factor
Selection
While related to the
offense, this factor can
not withstand constitutional scrutiny as an
eligibility factor
because it is unconstitutionally vague when
used as an element of
a crime rather than a
sentencing factor. May
still permissibly be
used as a selection factor.
Selection
While related to the
offense, this factor can
not withstand constitutional scrutiny as an
eligibility factor
because it is unconstitutionally vague when
used as an element of
a crime rather than a
sentencing factor. May
still permissibly be
used as a selection factor.
Eligibility
Describes the circumstances surrounding
the crime. Therefore,
it is a valid eligibility
factor.
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